The Analogy of Tradition: Method and Theological Judgment by Thiel, John E.
Fairfield University 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield 
Religious Studies Faculty Publications Religious Studies Department 
6-1-2005 
The Analogy of Tradition: Method and Theological Judgment 
John E. Thiel 
Fairfield University, jethiel@fairfield.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/religiousstudies-facultypubs 
Peer Reviewed 
Repository Citation 
Thiel, John E., "The Analogy of Tradition: Method and Theological Judgment" (2005). Religious Studies 
Faculty Publications. 42. 
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/religiousstudies-facultypubs/42 
Published Citation 
Thiel, John E. "The Analogy of Tradition: Method and Theological Judgment." Theological Studies 66.2 (2005): 
358-380. 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. 
Theological Studies 
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THE ANALOGY OF TRADITION: METHOD AND 
THEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT 
JOHN E. THIEL 
[The author examines a basic question for theological inquiry: how 
is congruence between past and present meaning achieved in tradi-
tion and in theological judgment? He begins by criticizing the ac-
count of traditional continuity offered in the recent work ofKathryn 
Tanner and by considering the limits of correlation in explaining 
congruence in theological judgment. Constructivelyy he proposes an 
understanding of method as a pragmatics of tradition in which a 
certain use of analogy accounts for traditional and theological con-
gruence.] 
T HE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE is an assumption of modern theology. Theologians typically understand their work as the practice of doc-
trinal development, and so as the practice of the assumption that doctrine 
develops. One would think that the basic practices that enact a field's 
assumptions would merit the closest scrutiny, since they take shape as 
disciplinary performance itself. To the contrary, the assumed, by its very 
nature, tends to pass unexamined before the critical eye. This often occurs 
because scholars think that basic practices obviously discharge the assump-
tions to which they are beholden. The disciplinary practice is taken to be so 
simple a rendition of the assumptions that a critical account of how the 
practice does what it does is deemed unnecessary. The practice is under-
taken as though it transcends method, sometimes even when the practice 
ostensibly enacts a method. Yet, on closer examination, the connection 
between practice and assumptions proves to be tenuous at best. A good 
example of such latitude in the field of theology can be found in how 
theologians practice the assumption of doctrinal development. 
Theologians engage in this interpretive practice all the time. But how, 
exactly, does this practice happen, and how, exactly, does one know when 
it is accomplished well or poorly? These are difficult questions to answer. 
JOHN E. THIEL received his Ph.D. from McMaster University. He is currently 
professor of religious studies at Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut. His 
most recent books include God, Evil, and Innocent Suffering: A Theological Re-
flection (Crossroad, 2002) and Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in 
Catholic Faith (Oxford University, 2000). At the present time he is working on a 
book dealing with eschatology. 
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One might begin by objecting that the questions are not posed very well, 
since any answer would never be a matter of "exactly." As Schleiermacher 
observed long ago, the practice of interpretation is not a science but an art.1 
This art is a matter of judgment that requires the theologian to bridge the 
distance, conceptually and expressively, between ancient meaning and its 
contemporary appropriation. It would not be difficult, however, to say 
exactly how interpretive practice fails. The extremes of the interpretive 
spectrum—mindless repetition and "anything goes" speculation—would 
fail for lack of judiciousness, by relinquishing the task of interpretation 
itself. It may be the case that saying how interpretive judgment takes place, 
exactly, between these extremes is neither possible nor even desirable, as 
long as method provides some general guidelines for the hermeneutical 
task to proceed meaningfully. 
But even if "exactly" happily eludes us, the goal of this article is to say 
more nearly how the assumption of doctrinal development is practiced in 
theological reflection. I argue for a more detailed account of the interpre-
tive practice at the heart of theological reflection, at the very point that 
theological judgment claims success. This more detailed account could be 
understood as a theological method, one that I will call the "analogy of 
tradition." I make no claims for the novelty of this method. I think that 
contemporary theologians actually do practice this method, though per-
haps without being conscious of doing so. Before I sketch this method and 
argue for its advantages, I will first define the theological problem that it 
addresses. 
CONGRUENCE IN TRADITION AND IN THEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT 
Any theological judgment attempts to reconcile the relevance of con-
temporary concerns with faithfulness to the past. Such a judgment posits a 
congruent relationship between past and present that may be weighted 
more on the authority of the past or more on the pressing needs of the 
moment, resulting in theological positions that are, respectively, more con-
servative or more liberal. By "congruent" I mean an interpretive relation-
ship characterized by meaningful continuity between the authoritative past 
and the contemporary theological claim, a continuity that believers under-
stand as the unity of tradition and the basis of Christian faithfulness 
through the ages. But how is this congruence in tradition achieved? And, 
more specifically, how does this congruence come to be formulated in a 
theological judgment? The first question has not troubled modern theol-
1
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter Universitatsverlag, 1974) 75. 
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ogy. As I have already noted, the development of doctrine is an assumption 
of modern theology, and one that takes the congruence of developing 
tradition for granted as one of its authentic traits. The second question has 
been answered by any number of modern theorists on theological method 
who have explained how congruence is formulated in theological judgment. 
It would seem, then, that these questions have proven unproblematic, the 
first because it has not been raised and the second because it has been 
answered so easily and so often. I will argue that the assumption of tradi-
tional congruence requires the careful justification that it typically has 
lacked, and that the methodological explanations of congruence in theo-
logical judgment typically are rather thin since the congruence they explain 
is largely assumed. With regard to the first question, the work of Kathryn 
Tanner can help us to appreciate why the assumption of congruence in 
tradition is a large assumption indeed, and one that should not be made 
uncritically. 
In her important book Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology, 
Tanner considers the implications of postmodern cultural theory for Chris-
tian claims about the continuity of tradition. If one truly appreciates the 
remarkable diversity that flourishes in any culture, Tanner argues, then one 
should be suspicious of customary Christian beliefs about the unity of the 
cultural meaning system that Christians call "tradition." It may be tempting 
to think of cultures as the "wholes" they are usually made out to be, by 
insiders and outsiders alike. Understood, though, as the practice of every-
day life, a culture takes shape as a limitless proliferation of meaning that 
defies the unity, stability, and continuity over time that a structuralist mind-
set projects onto it. Traditional conceptions of culture, including those of 
modern anthropologists, tend to deny internal difference, allowing differ-
ence to appear only at the margins of society where strained encounter 
with other cultures reifies the myth of internal homogeneity. A postmodern 
cultural theory, faithful to the evidence of cultural life "on the ground," 
recognizes the remarkable array of different beliefs and practices that any 
culture is. Tanner maintains that extensive pluralism does not subvert the 
possibility of cultural consensus. But in actual cultural life that consensus 
"becomes . . . extremely minimalistic: it forms the basis for conflict as much 
as it forms the basis for shared beliefs and sentiments."2 Culture, she 
proposes, is better conceived as a locus of contested engagement than as a 
coalescence of shared beliefs and practices. 
The assumption of congruence in tradition meets a significant challenge 
in Tanner's position. A religious tradition, she avers, behaves just as any 
culture does. In spite of its portrayal as a unified whole, it is actually an 
2
 Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapo-
lis: Fortress, 1997) 57. 
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amalgam of beliefs and practices that hangs together only in the loosest 
ways. Christian tradition is as porous as any culture. Its boundaries are 
fluid and permeable; its cohesion little more than acts of imagination and 
power serving a host of interests. The unity of Christian tradition, Tanner 
points out, cannot be supported by historical investigation since such study 
documents Christian disagreement through the ages about virtually every 
matter of valued belief and practice. Even the most basic beliefs of Chris-
tianity—such as the belief in one God—instantly proliferate when ex-
tended to other beliefs, like God's relationship to the world, or to practices, 
like what moral faithfulness to the one God really means.3 
Tanner does not conclude that Christian tradition is a chimera, only that 
it is not some special case exempt from the ordinary workings of culture. 
Christianity "may be called a tradition in the sense it amounts to a whole 
ongoing way of life." But so understood, "talk of tradition is just a way of 
formulating . . . questions about Christian identity . . . and is not a way of 
answering them."4 She proposes that the unity of Christian tradition lies 
in shared concerns among Christians about the "materials" that they 
value—such as texts, creedal formulae, and rituals—rather than in agree-
ment about what these materials mean. Moreover, the unity of tradition, 
and so Christian identity, lies in the commitment Christians make to the 
ongoing task of arguing about the meaning of their materials, "[g]reat 
diversity and conflict of particular interpretations [being] . . . more often 
than not the result."5 
If Tanner is correct, then the assumption of congruence in tradition 
cannot be justified by cultural behavior. Traditional congruence presumes 
some level of semantic agreement through the ages. Tanner's analysis con-
cludes that such congruence is absent both diachronically and synchroni-
cally. Tanner makes this point well by criticizing the assumption of con-
gruence in premodern and modern notions of tradition. Such "accounts of 
tradition make continuity in either traditional materials or the process of 
transmission a presumption by isolating something from the vicissitudes of 
history to guarantee it."6 Attending specifically to the modern conception 
of tradition as development, Tanner observes that "[g]reater attention is 
given here to the process of transmission, but it is a process in which, it is 
hoped, an identity of content or substance in what is transmitted is re-
tained." In such a view, difference in any moment of historical develop-
ment "amounts only to making explicit what was implicit before." The 
3
 Ibid. 146. See Tanner's important study of the diversity of ethical belief in the 
one God. Kathryn Tanner, The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social 
Justice (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992). 
4
 Ibid. 128. 5 Ibid. 153. 
6
 Ibid. 131. 
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metaphor of organic life promotes the hope for continuity by imaging a 
history in which "later developments are somehow present in a nascent 
form earlier," just as later growth manifests the substance of the original 
seed.7 Tanner sees in this modern theory an unwillingness to acknowledge 
the real evidence of history: 
Thus, when organic life is the model for understanding tradition, no amount of 
diversity in what Christians say and do need dislodge the presumption of their 
agreement so long as they all seem members of an historically continuous, self-
generating sequence of events; historical evidence of conflict and contradiction can 
always be undercut by the claim of their containment within a higher-order process 
that remains continuous.8 
This analysis demonstrates good cause to question the assumption of con-
gruence in tradition, including the modern conception of tradition as the 
development of doctrine. This questionability does not force the conclusion 
that traditional congruence is impossible. It does suggest, though, that 
claims for congruence must be carefully justified and cannot be naively 
assumed. 
Suppose, though, that congruence were rooted in a developing tradition 
in some way or another so that its assumption were obviously warranted, 
and to such a degree that Tanner would cease to be concerned about all the 
issues she has raised. We would still need to explain how that congruence 
could be formulated in actual theological judgments, themselves exercises 
in doctrinal development. As noted, there is no shortage of methodological 
explanations for how particular theological judgments can be congruent. 
Certainly the most prevalent theological method in the modern tradition is 
some variety of correlation. According to this approach, the theologian's 
interpretive abilities synthesize past and present, resulting in a contempo-
rary appropriation of the faith that is congruent with the former and rel-
evant to the latter. This interpretive reconstruction requires three distin-
guishable moments in judgment: the theologian must understand the clas-
sical doctrine being reconstructed in its own historical context; the 
theologian must accurately assess the contemporary cultural circumstances 
within which the classical doctrine is being reconstructed; and, finally, the 
theologian must offer an interpretive reconstruction that is congruent with 
the past and meaningful to the present. 
It is this third, synthetic moment in theological judgment that proves 
difficult to explain because it purports to offer something more in the act 
of interpretation that cannot easily be explained with the precision that 
method requires. As difficult as it may be to explain the first and second 
moments in interpretation, they yet aim at judgments contextualized by 
7
 Ibid. 129. Ibid. 131. 
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particular historical circumstances, whether past or present. Even though 
the object of interpretation in these moments may range from the con-
creteness of a carefully preserved text to the ephemeral character of a local 
mentality, interpretation at these levels is historically determinate, and 
kept so by a methodological awareness of the many particularities 
that might be factored into a viable interpretation. Thus, the task of 
method involves explaining the role of these particularities in the act of 
understanding. But the third interpretive moment presses beyond these 
relatively determinate parameters to posit a feature that transcends 
them—the congruence that the reconstructive theological judgment claims 
with the past. 
Whether or not a particular theological judgment actually delivers on its 
claim for congruence is, of course, a matter of performance measured 
by further theological judgment. A community of interpretation may 
judge that a particular theological reconstruction fails to execute the 
method of correlation because it misrepresents either the authoritative past 
or the character of contemporary experience and, as a consequence of 
either failure, cannot achieve the relevant continuity expected of a success-
ful act of correlation. Or, having accurately represented the interpretive 
poles of correlation, the execution of the method might be judged to fail 
because the interpretive synthesis lacks continuity or relevance or both. 
Performance aside, though, correlationist interpretation assumes that con-
gruence is an achievable feature of the third moment of theological judg-
ment. 
There is nothing wrong with this assumption as long as it is shared in a 
community of interpreters which it well serves, and as long as interpreters 
do not exaggerate the capacity of theological method to explain the as-
sumption beyond its claims. Typically, practitioners of the method of cor-
relation are keenly aware of the fact that theological hermeneutics flour-
ishes in the circle of faith. Sometimes, though, the concerns of correlation 
can suggest that its primary interpretive goal involves explaining the claims 
of faith to a broader public or even to a universal audience. If correlation 
is expected to proceed in this way, then the third interpretive moment is 
burdened with a weight it cannot bear. In this case, the explanation of the 
third moment is called upon to express the assumption of continuity that 
religious claims for tradition are wont to make and to do so in a manner 
cogent to those who do not share this assumption. This kind of explanatory 
overdetermination proceeds as though the theological use of a hermeneuti-
cal theory can convey universal meaning simply by virtue of its respect-
ability in quarters beyond the community of faith. Yet, on closer exami-
nation, the theory invoked only offers the possibility of universality in 
understanding by investing some metaphor for epistemic reconciliation 
with remarkable explanatory power. Metaphors such as the "merging of 
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horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung),9 the "fusion of past and present,"10 
the "conversion" of the interpreter to the interpreted,11 "reflective equi-
librium,"12 the "retrieval" of content in contemporary form,13 or even the 
term "correlation" itself,14 all attempt to convey the workings of the third 
interpretive moment, expressing at once the unity attributed to an authen-
tic act of understanding and the congruence of tradition posited in that 
same unity. 
Metaphors, however, do not possess the ability to ground understanding 
or traditional continuity. Functioning like a poetics of judgment, the meta-
phors express the epistemic reconciliation of the universal in the particular 
and, more specifically, the traditional reconciliation of past and present for 
which theological interpretation aims. To the degree that each of the meta-
phors can be invoked to convey both of these epistemic and traditional 
concerns at once, they are all the more valued as linguistic conveyors of 
what successful theological judgment hopes to achieve. But in themselves, 
the metaphors and the theoretical accounts they express do not validate 
anything at all. They do not explain how congruence actually happens in a 
theological judgment, only how the goal of congruence, the experience of 
congruence, or the claims of congruence might be expressed in images. The 
effect of the metaphor, one might say, is to express the assumption of 
congruence meaningfully claimed in a particular act of theological judg-
ment. Images for agreement like those cited above, however, cannot ex-
plain how congruence actually takes shape in theological judgments. 
9
 Many theologians have found this imagery, drawn from Hans-Georg Gadam-
er's Wahrheit und Methode, to be an effective expression of the hermeneutical 
project. See especially, David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in 
Theology (New York: Seabury, 1975) 78; also his, The Analogical Imagination: 
Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981) 
99-135. 
10
 Roger Haight, S.J., Dynamics of Theology (New York: Paulist, 1990) 191. 
11
 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., Method in Theology (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972) 235-66. In spite of Neil Ormerod's efforts to distinguish Lonergan's 
method (and, following Lonergan, Robert Doran's method) from correlation, I 
would place more stock in his concession that, on the face of it, Lonergan's (and 
Doran's) "project bears a strong resemblance to the description of the method of 
correlation" (Neil Ormerod, "Quarrels with the Method of Correlation," Theologi-
cal Studies 57 [1996] 711). And rather than finding in Lonerganian "conversion" a 
non-arbitrary criterion for interpretive judgment, as Ormerod does (712-13), I 
would take the term to function as another synthetic metaphor for epistemic rec-
onciliation. 
12
 Francis Schtissler Fiorenza, Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church 
(New York: Crossroad, 1986) 283-311. 
13
 This has been an axiomatic discourse on the part of many late-20th-century 
Protestant and Catholic theologians. 
14
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967) 
59-66; Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order 45-46. 
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In making this point, I am not suggesting that theological judgments 
reached through correlation fail because the method's third moment only 
expresses the goal, experience, or the claims of congruence. The success of 
a theological judgment is measured by its acceptance in the community of 
faith, and theological judgments reached through correlation have been 
extraordinarily successful in this regard. But correlation is much better at 
offering methodological accounts of its first and second moments, in which 
no claim is made for congruence, than it is at offering a methodological 
account of the third moment, in which congruence is claimed. And to the 
degree that the third moment in correlation is much more a poetics than a 
methodological explanation, it does not explain how congruence comes to 
be formulated in theological judgment with the exactness one expects of 
method. 
THE PERSISTENCE OF ANALOGY IN CATHOLIC METHOD 
Another way of making the same point about the explanatory limits of 
correlation would be to note that this method takes its point of departure 
from the Kantian philosophical project and, more recently, from the phe-
nomenological tradition represented by Heidegger, Gadamer, and 
Ricoeur. Here, the critique of traditional metaphysics issued in epistemolo-
gies that stressed the role of agency in understanding, an agency rooted in 
the transcendental conditions of subjectivity itself. However measured by 
its own historicity, transcendental subjectivity formally establishes the pos-
sibility of meaning in these philosophies and functions as the power of 
hermeneutical construction. Theologians found this philosophical ap-
proach useful not only because it defined a respectable current in modern 
thought but also because its account of rational agency could be appropri-
ated methodologically. Correlationists from Schleiermacher to Rahner and 
his contemporary disciples have argued in various ways that the modern 
philosophical "turn to the subject" is fully realized in the act of faith, itself 
the consummate experience of self-transcendence. Mystical sensibilities 
could posit a tacit identity between the conditions of subjectivity (as noetic 
transcendence) and the act of faith (as transcendence toward God). This 
perceived compatibility between transcendental subjectivity and the act of 
faith allowed correlationists to see an agential unity between these expe-
riences at work in the third moment of their method, with transcendental 
subjectivity supplying the conditions for the possibility of hermeneutical 
reconciliation and faith supplying the traditional congruence required in 
any successful interpretation. To the degree that this hermeneutical coop-
eration of transcendental subjectivity and faith promulgates mystical sen-
sibilities, it is not surprising that its interpretive achievement is conveyed 
much more in metaphorical images than in exact, methodological explanation. 
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As Catholic theology embraced modernity, hermeneutics overshadowed 
metaphysical analogy as credible method, at least on the part of the many 
theologians committed to apologetics. Metaphysical analogy made the doc-
trine of creation central to theological reflection, and thus gave ontology 
primacy over epistemology. The Kantian critique of traditional metaphys-
ics undermined this long-standing conception of theology as analogical 
speculation, a philosophical stance that modern and postmodern herme-
neutics regarded as intellectually axiomatic. The method of correlation 
appeared in theology as a viable alternative to metaphysical analogy. Its 
willingness to parse theological understanding through the historicity of 
interpretation satisfied post-Kantian concerns for the limitations of knowl-
edge. Its diminishment of the doctrine of creation in theological reflection 
allowed the doctrine of grace to grow in methodological importance, es-
pecially as an unstated presupposition for how theological judgment rec-
onciles past and present and achieves the value of congruence. 
As much as analogy in a traditional key has been rendered theologically 
questionable, it is yet interesting to note how analogy has persisted as a 
theme in Catholic thought. In the early 20th-century, Erich Przywara ar-
ticulated a distinctly modern version of the analogia ends that took account 
of both transcendental subjectivity and the metaphysical order as the com-
mon realm of creatureliness through which faith-filled reasoning encoun-
ters both the presence and otherness of God. Przywara's eclectic under-
standing of analogy even included a dialectical interpretation of the Cross, 
a classically Lutheran theme. Even though his treatment of analogy was 
untraditionally pluralistic in some respects, Przywara saw his work as a 
contribution to a theme consistently at the heart of Catholic thought. He 
insisted that metaphysical analogy is not merely one option among others 
within the Catholic heritage of reflection. "For the historical system of the 
Great Tradition (Ur-Tradition)," Przywara asserts, "appears not as some-
thing 'constructed out of the analogia ends, rather, the analogia ends shows 
itself to be the rhythm of its inner movement."15 Even if Przywara's claim 
seems somewhat inflated in an age that increasingly has appreciated the 
pluralism of Catholic thinking, he is certainly correct to highlight the at-
tractiveness of analogy for Catholic theology, even throughout the modern 
period. This attractiveness is evinced in the continuing appropriation and 
adaptation of analogy in the work of Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, 
Joseph Marechal, Emerich Coreth, David Burrell, and David Tracy.16 
15
 Erich Przywara, Analogia Ends: Metaphysik: Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus, 
2nd ed. (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1962) 204. 
16
 The observation about Gilson, Maritain, Marechal, Coreth, and Burrell is 
Tracy's (The Analogical Imagination, 414). Recently, Robert Masson has called 
attention to the various ways in which analogy is understood in theological dis-
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Of these inventive thinkers, David Tracy has demonstrated the flexibility 
of analogy most of all by making it central to his own hermeneutical ap-
proach to theology, and so, with some measure of irony, appropriating for 
the modern trajectory of transcendental subjectivity an important dimen-
sion of the reflective approach it criticized. For Tracy, analogy is not a 
metaphysics but a rhetoric. It is a "language of ordered relationships ar-
ticulating similarity-in-difference," a language that finally can find inter-
pretive harmony among the plenitude of past and present forms that com-
prise a religious tradition.17 Moreover, analogy describes the creative 
workings of the theological imagination that is able to see similarity in 
difference, and through such vision to reach an understanding of how 
religious meaning illuminates self, society, history, and cosmos. Although 
that imaginative power finally takes its orientation from a specific religious 
tradition, it is not restricted to it but is capable of recognizing "the pro-
found similarities-in-difference in all reality,"18 and thus breaks open in-
terpretive directions that are both particular and universal in scope. 
The persistence of analogy in the Catholic tradition likely reflects basic 
Catholic beliefs about the relationship between nature and grace. Both 
metaphysical and rhetorical approaches to analogy affirm God's sacramen-
tal presence to the natural world, and the ability of the human person to 
respond freely to that presence, even, as the theologian does, by capturing 
the unity of God and creatures in theological homologies. The distinctive-
ness of analogy as a Catholic approach to theological reflection has even 
been accentuated by the modern era's concern for the particularities of 
method, especially those defined by confessional beliefs. The polemical 
exchange between Karl Barth and Przywara over the integrity of meta-
physical analogy, and Hans Urs von Balthasar's charting of the debate in 
several writings, was influential in differentiating Catholic and Protestant 
methodological approaches as, respectively, "analogy" and "dialectic," the 
distinction itself a rhetoric expressing differing confessional commitments 
on the relationship between nature and grace.19 
course, and to how the failure to appreciate this variety can lead to misunderstand-
ing between theologians. Robert Masson, "Analogy and Metaphoric Process," 
Theological Studies 62 (2001) 571-96. I agree completely with Masson's implicit 
conclusion that the pluralism in conceptions of analogy means that analogical dis-
course is itself analogical, and recognize that this observation applies to the pro-
posal I will offer in the pages that follow. 
17
 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination 405. 
18
 Ibid. 410. 
19
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Analogie und Dialektik," Divus Thomas 22 (1944) 
171-216; idem, "Analogie und Natur," Divus Thomas 23 (1945) 3-56. See also 
James V. Zeitz, "Przywara and von Balthasar on Analogy," The Thomist 52 (1988) 
473-98. For an interesting discussion of Barth on the analogia fidei, see Christopher 
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It would be advantageous, I propose, to continue this Catholic devotion 
to analogy in theological method, not metaphysically in Przywara's style 
but linguistically in the approach broadly commended by Tracy. Although 
I have been critical of the method of correlation's ability to explain theo-
logical congruence with sufficient rigor, I remain convinced with Tracy that 
its attention to language rather than to ontology has accomplished much as 
a post-Enlightenment strategy, and with Tracy convinced too of the en-
during value of analogy. In the pages that follow, I argue for a kind of 
linguistic analogy that describes more thickly how a claim for congruence 
actually appears in theological interpretation. As much as this analogy 
accounts for theological interpretation, it does not originate in theological 
thinking but rather in the way that believers make claims about tradition. 
Our consideration of congruence in theological judgment, then, must fol-
low a discussion of analogy in tradition. 
TRADITION AS ANALOGICAL CONTINUITY 
A considerable amount of time and effort has been devoted to the topic 
of tradition in post-Enlightenment theology. Nineteenth-century theolo-
gians such as Johann Sebastian Drey, Johann Adam Mohler, and John 
Henry Newman proposed theories of doctrinal development that at-
tempted to reconcile theology's new sense of historicity with long-held 
Christian claims about the continuity of tradition. Since the Second Vatican 
Council, a second wave in the theology of tradition has appeared in the 
work of theologians who challenged the a-historical sensibilities of neo-
Scholasticism. Most notable among these was Yves Congar, whose magis-
terial La Tradition et les traditions promulgated an understanding of tra-
dition as an active process involving the reception and, as Congar put it, 
re-reception of the authoritative teachings and practices of the past by 
contemporary believers.20 The reception model has become a kind of theo-
logical commonsense since the Council, embraced by the magisterium and 
theologians alike. 
As one might expect, the assumptions at work in a modern understand-
ing of tradition have shaped how theology itself is conceived and practiced. 
Doctrinal development assumes the historicity of meaning and the ines-
capably interpretive character of experience and its cultural construction. 
Morse, "Raising God's Eyebrows: Some Further Thoughts on the Analogia Fidei," 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 37 (1981-82) 39-49. 
20
 Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., La Tradition et les traditions, vol. 1: Essai historique 
(Paris: Fayard, 1960); vol. 2: Essai theologique (Paris: Fayard, 1963). Also, Yves 
Congar, "La 'reception' comme realite ecclesiologique," Revue des sciences phi-
losophiques et theologiques 56 (1972) 369-403. 
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To the degree that theology is the practice of doctrinal development, these 
same assumptions enter its disciplinary repertoire, resulting in an under-
standing of theology as ever revisable interpretation and, lately, in theolo-
gy's postmodern attention to the pluralism of meaning in local cultures. 
One would be hard pressed to find more particular influences of the the-
ology of tradition on theological method itself, beyond, again, the general 
sense that method is assumed to be a thoroughly hermeneutical en-
deavor.21 Tradition tends to enter Catholic theological method as one of 
several "sources" of interpretation. Along with Scripture and experience, 
tradition has been conceived as a kind of interpretive ingredient that con-
tributes its own measure of truth to the creative synthesis of theological 
judgment. Rather than understand tradition as a factor in theological in-
terpretation, we would do better to regard it as the practice of faith that 
configures the congruence to which theological judgment aspires. Analogy 
offers an interesting way to imagine how such congruence is affirmed in the 
pattern of tradition. 
Recently, I have argued for what I have called a "retrospective" under-
standing of tradition that traces the continuity of tradition from present to 
past, rather than from past to present.22 Premodern and modern concep-
tions of tradition typically imagine continuity as a given feature of every 
moment of traditional time, from the apostolic age to the present. A pre-
modern conception of tradition sees such continuity unchangingly manifest 
in the orthodox faith and practice handed down by every generation to the 
next. A modern conception of tradition as the development of doctrine 
sees such continuity as at least latent in every moment, and manifesting 
itself gradually as history unfolds. Both premodern and modern concep-
tions envisage tradition prospectively. They imagine tradition from the 
perspective of an idealized observer at its beginnings in the apostolic age 
looking forward into the future, across the ages, and seeing the one and 
same continuity, or at least its possibility, in every time. This prospective 
optics actually imagines tradition from a divine perspective, since only God 
could envision tradition in this manner. The attractiveness of this forward-
looking optics is that it clearly affirms the unbroken history of continuity 
expected by premodern and modern conceptions of tradition. 
A retrospective understanding of tradition relinquishes this divine per-
21
 Lonergan articulated well this general influence of historical sensibilities on 
theology: "When the classicist notion of theology prevails, theology is conceived as 
a permanent achievement, and then one discourses on its nature. When culture is 
conceived empirically, theology is known to be an ongoing process, and then one 
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York: Herder and Herder, 1972] xi). 
22
 John E. Thiel, Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in Catholic 
Faith (New York: Oxford University, 2000) esp. 84-95. 
370 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
spective, which no creature may have, and configures traditional continuity 
from the present moment in ecclesial life. Tradition, after all, is a corporate 
act of faith that the Church makes about when and where and how God's 
Spirit has truthfully wended its way through history. This corporate claim 
is a consensus drawn from many individual acts of faith that are always 
situated in a present moment and which, from that present moment looking 
backward, affirm a particular belief about the presence of the Spirit 
through time. This retrospective affirmation is the Church's belief about 
the continuity of tradition. As much as continuity can be imagined as a 
fixed commodity abidingly present from the earliest Church to the present, 
it is, in actuality, a retrospective claim about the unity of tradition that 
continues only as long as it is presently believed. What moderns have 
conceived as the development of tradition unfolds in perceptible changes in 
how the pattern of retrospective continuity is modified in successive 
present moments. And if the continuity of tradition lies in the claims of 
corporate acts of faith developing in time, then what modern theories are 
inclined to distinguish as the "continuity" of tradition and the "develop-
ment" of tradition are actually the same thing. 
Saying that the "continuity" and the "development" of tradition are 
actually the same thing might suggest a position quite like Tanner'sr with its 
deep suspicion of any real continuity in tradition beyond the ongoing, 
historical debate among Christians about what tradition is. A retrospective 
understanding of tradition, however, affirms real continuity as a claim that 
Christians make about the unity of tradition from their own times back to 
the apostolic age. Certainly there are some Christian claims—such as the 
profession of Jesus as savior, the indispensability of grace for salvation, and 
the hope of resurrected life—that believers have made consistently from 
the beginnings of the tradition to the present. And yet, even these rela-
tively settled and uncontroversial claims for tradition continue to flourish 
as retrospective acts of faith, developing if only in their stolid reaffirmation. 
More surprising affirmations of continuity occur as any particular genera-
tion of believers layers these more stable lines of tradition with new claims 
for retrospective continuity that may develop, slowly or quickly, into 
present claims for the apostolic tradition. By the same token, a strand 
within tradition's long-held claims may atrophy, slowly or quickly, to the 
point that a particular generation judges the belief to be incredible, and so 
no longer the Church's tradition. Through the reaffirmation of the truly 
old, the accretion of the relatively new, or the shedding of the old but 
obsolete, the entire community of faith comes to affirm a developing con-
tinuity that, in any present moment, may look quite like the faith of times 
long past in some respects, and quite different from the claims of earlier 
believers in other respects. 
This retrospective understanding of tradition, then, understands conti-
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nuity to be thoroughly temporal, as all things traditional are, and measures 
the time in which continuity is claimed in faith from present to past. So 
understood, the continuity of tradition develops at once repetitively and 
dynamically, as old configurations of continuity are reaffirmed alongside 
new affirmations of continuity for addition and loss that are often mutually 
related. What I would call the "literal sense" of tradition23 lies in present 
claims for continuity that are uncontroversial, not because their meaning is 
judged to be trivial but because there is a real consensus among believers 
about the truthfulness of these claims as the age-old faith of the Church. 
Many of the claims of the literal sense, like those cited above, are histori-
cally old and are continuous by virtue of their repetition in every genera-
tion of believers. But claims for the literal sense in any historical moment 
in which they are affirmed need not be historically old, even though they 
are claimed in faith as the apostolic tradition. A good example of the latter 
would be the teaching of the Second Vatican Council's "Declaration on 
Religious Freedom" (Dignitatis humanae) which portrayed the freedom of 
religious belief as a sacred right revealed by God, and so a teaching rightly 
placed within the apostolic tradition, even though this teaching was neither 
believed, nor taught, nor practiced in the previous history of the Church, 
and defined rather suddenly in 1965.24 
This understanding of traditional continuity can stand before the criti-
cisms advanced by Kathryn Tanner and examined earlier.25 As devastating 
as Tanner's position may be for any fundamentalist understanding of tra-
ditional continuity, its deep suspicion of any real continuity in tradition fails 
to acknowledge that the literal sense of tradition is a claim that a particular 
Christian community makes in faith retrospectively. Tanner advances her 
argument against synchronic continuity, one notices, by making an ahis-
torical and idealized "Christianity" the measure of synchronic and dia-
chronic continuity. But "Christianity"—what all Christians believe—is an 
abstraction that does not exist "on the ground," the very place from which 
Tanner's anthropological approach gathers its evidence. Synchronic conti-
nuity actually exists more modestly in history in specific Christian tradi-
tions shaped by particular kinds of agreement in faith. Present-day agree-
ment, for example, certainly does not exist between all Christians on a 
doctrinal issue like the relationship between nature and grace. And yet, 
Roman Catholic Christians in the present historical moment do indeed 
23
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share a belief about this same matter. Tanner's argument against di-
achronic continuity is simply that the evidence of history does not warrant 
such a claim. But this judgment wrongly makes chronological history the 
measure of traditional continuity, itself a claim made in faith about the 
temporal pattern of divine truth and providence. Judged against this stan-
dard, it is hardly surprising that traditional continuity evaporates like 
morning dew in the sun. Even though faith-claims for traditional continuity 
are in history and so are a part of the historical record of Christianity, they 
can no more be theologically measured by chronological history than the 
truth of the gospels can be measured theologically by the Jesus of history 
or the resurrection of Jesus can be measured theologically by the laws of 
physics. 
Understood retrospectively and particularly, the literal sense of tradition 
runs counter to the direction of chronological time as the Church's con-
temporary, and developing, affirmation of how its belief, doctrine, and 
practice stand in continuity with the faith of the apostles. As an act of faith, 
this affirmation of congruence is no mere possibility but instead the most 
ordinary of actualities in the daily life of the Church, and one that believers 
attribute largely to divine grace. Tanner, then, is correct to point out that 
the congruence of tradition is a very large assumption indeed, as the claims 
of faith always are. 
To say that claims for the congruence of tradition are claims of faith, 
however, should not be invoked as an explanatory panacea. If present-day 
claims for a particular configuration of the apostolic tradition differ from 
the claims of earlier generations of believers, then explaining how this can 
be so, contrary to the historical record, is incumbent on any theology of 
tradition worth its salt. A premodern understanding of tradition is unaware 
of the historical record and so is able naively to regard present-day claims 
for the apostolic tradition as what every previous generation believed in 
exactly the same way. Here, difference is heretical deviation. Aware of the 
historical record, a modern understanding of tradition as the development 
of doctrine regards the historical absence of present-day claims for the 
apostolic tradition as latency through which later developments have 
grown. Here, difference is potential. A premodern understanding of tra-
dition held in the modern period, i.e., fundamentalism, denies the truth of 
the historical record of which it is aware. Here, difference is the perdition 
of a merely secular account of reality. None of these explanations is ad-
equate—neither the premodern understandings for their naive or willed 
ignorance of the facts of history nor the modern understanding for its 
recourse to a romantic metaphysics of essence and manifestation to explain 
the gaps in the history of doctrine. 
The retrospective model addresses the problem of continuity and change 
by regarding congruence as a claim made in faith by present-day believers 
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about how they stand in a line of truth that extends back to the apostolic 
age. It is a claim that can neither be ignorant of chronological history nor 
beholden to it. Claims for congruence presently affirmed as sacred tradi-
tion often cannot be justified by the evidence of chronological history, as 
Tanner rightly points out. And yet, those even centuries-long gaps in the 
historical record would only subvert a faith-claim for a particular pattern of 
continuity if one assumed that claims for the apostolic tradition were his-
torically identical with the retrospective claims of faith made in the apos-
tolic age, or if one assumed that traditional continuity requires chronolog-
ical justification in order to be true. A retrospective understanding of 
tradition would share neither of these assumptions. 
Retrospective claims for the continuity of tradition can find their way 
through the brokenness of chronological history by tracing the Spirit's 
abiding presence through the retrospective claims of previous generations 
of believers all the way back to the apostolic age. As long as such a present-
day affirmation of apostolic continuity recognizes that it is a claim made in 
faith about sacred time, the gaps in the historical record need not prove 
defeating. A good example of such a retrospective claim for apostolic 
continuity in the face of chronological history can be found in the present-
day Catholic literal sense belief in the Immaculate Conception of Mary. 
Historical study shows that this belief did not become popular until the 
14th century and that, prior to that time, no less an authority than Thomas 
Aquinas found it to be incredible.26 In principle, the belief that Mary, the 
Mother of God, was herself conceived without original sin could not have 
been widely held by Christians prior to Augustine's fifth-century definition 
of the doctrine of original sin in the Pelagian controversy. And yet, Pius IX, 
in his solemn definition of the dogma in 1854, described it as "a doctrine 
revealed by God . . . [which] therefore must be firmly and constantly held 
by the faithful,"27 as it indeed was by the 19th century. Explained retro-
spectively, this claim for apostolic tradition can be justified by finding a 
pattern of continuity that stretches backward from the present-day claim, 
to the increasing belief in the doctrine since the 14th century that united 
even earlier retrospective beliefs about the sinlessness of the Savior, the 
dignity of Mary as the Mother of God, and Augustine's development of 
Paul's strong conception of human fallenness. Thus construed from present 
to past in solidarity with previous generations of believers, a present-day 
claim for apostolic continuity can traverse the gaps of chronological time. 
26
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We might conceive of this way of configuring continuity as an exercise in 
the analogy of faith and, to the degree that faith may be expressed as claims 
about the Spirit's presence to history, as an exercise in the analogy of 
tradition. Analogy posits meaningful similarity-in-difference in whatever 
dimension of reality the analogue highlights, whether in language, or ex-
perience, or in being. Here, our focus on traditional faith-claims leads us to 
attend to analogy from a linguistic perspective, while regarding that lan-
guage as inseparably bound to the experience it expresses and shapes, and 
to the being to which language refers. Claims about tradition are thor-
oughly analogical. In professing the unity of tradition, believers give voice 
to a belief or enact a practice that most obviously is theirs, but which also 
is claimed as the belief and practice of others, and which so, on another 
level, is belief and practice other than theirs. These "others" are both 
contemporary believers who are not distant in time but who may be rela-
tively distant in culture, and believers long dead who are distant in culture 
and time as well. Yet, in professing the unity of tradition, believers affirm 
that their faith and practice, both diachronically and synchronically, is like 
the belief and practice of these others, in spite of the striking differences in 
time, place, circumstance, and culture that divide them. This analogical 
likeness is not claimed as a mere casual resemblance. Perceived through 
the eyes of faith, analogical likeness is the deep congruence of a shared 
faith capable of binding the tradition from present to past. It is an analogi-
cal continuity justified by the oneness of the body of Christ, and marking 
the truthful presence of the Holy Spirit through time, place, circumstance, 
and culture. 
At first glance, the most steadfast, literal sense claims of tradition, which 
even historical investigation shows have been affirmed throughout the 
ages, might seem to transcend this analogical similarity-in-difference by 
virtue of their continuous repetition. Yet, on closer examination, even 
these long-standing claims, which flourish only in their present affirmation, 
are always somewhat different from the past claims they ardently reaffirm. 
Even as reaffirmations of the tradition, the present claims for the age-old 
tradition are ever made anew, and so each act of faith posits a difference 
that must be at once appreciated and transcended in the claim for conti-
nuity. At the heart of this dimension of tradition we meet a continuity 
solidified within a remarkable pluralism of dissimilar times and cultures. 
Within this pluralism of time and place we find an even greater pluralism 
of individual acts of faith, the most recent faithfully striving to find in those 
that came before an analogue to their own claims for the apostolic truth. 
Literal sense claims that are more circumscribed historically, like the 
dogma of the Immaculate Conception or Vatican IPs teaching on religious 
freedom, may also be conceived through the image of analogical continu-
ity. Here, though, the more extensive historical gaps that faith must retro-
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spectively traverse require that analogical similarity be found not only in 
acts of faith across time and culture but also in various doctrines defined 
throughout the tradition as common acts of faith. Although these doctrines 
are by no means the same, believers find a homology between them that 
becomes the basis for their present-day claim for apostolic continuity. Once 
again, the Immaculate Conception of Mary may serve as an example. Lat-
ter-day believers in the dogma affirm it as abiding tradition by finding a 
real homology among the doctrines it presupposes and affirms as a claim 
about the Mother of God, doctrines such as the sinlessness of the Savior, 
the dignity of Mary, and Augustine's further strengthening of Paul's al-
ready strong conception of sin. This homology extends across time in a way 
that the evidence of chronological history does not, and forms a continuity 
that contemporary believers analogically may trace back to the earliest 
beliefs of the apostles. 
The relations between and among claims for the old (even if not histori-
cally old) are not the only kind of analogy that can be identified in the 
workings of tradition. The traditional reiteration of old claims in the pres-
ent moment is often accompanied by claims for the traditionally new. 
These novel claims cannot be regarded as authoritative tradition since they 
lack the deep consensus on the part of the whole Church that literal sense 
tradition requires. Nonetheless, the minority of the faithful who make a 
novel claim profess the belief that their claim deserves to be recognized as 
the age-old faith of the Church even if historical investigation clearly shows 
that their claim was not previously believed in the way it is presently 
articulated. Nearly every literal sense claim of the tradition was once a 
novel claim, which means, of course, that the development of tradition 
proceeds as the new is embraced, quickly or slowly, as the old. Contem-
porary minority beliefs and practices like gender-inclusive symbolism of 
God, the ethical authority of the preferential option for the poor, and the 
new argument that the restriction of priestly ministry to males is divine 
revelation are all examples of novel claims of faith that may or may not 
prove to be authoritative tradition with the passing of time.28 
Believers advance novel claims on behalf of tradition, at least implicitly, 
by finding analogues within the recognized authority of the literal sense 
that justifies their claims for congruence. These analogical connections 
between the literal sense and novel claims are always tenuous, since here 
analogical similarity faces a difference that is scandalous and marked by 
both the strangeness and the minority status of the claim. Difference in this 
regard is no longer merely the dissimilarity of re-affirmation in many times 
and places but the threatening difference of apparent deviation that yet 
claims orthodoxy. If the novel claim eventually becomes literal-sense tra-
28
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dition, this threatening difference will be transformed into the customary 
difference of repetition as the whole Church increasingly affirms the ana-
logical similarity between the new belief and the literal sense to the point 
that the latter engulfs the former. It is important to note too that this 
development may unfold at the same time through judgments in faith 
measured by what we might call "disanalogy." Often, though not always, 
claims for the traditionally new are accompanied by claims that some long-
standing belief or practice has become questionable or even rejectable, and 
so disanalogous with a re-configured analogical continuity that binds the 
tradition into a whole.29 
Since the 19th century, theologians have proposed several images for the 
development of doctrine, among them, Johann Sebastian Drey's notion of 
a productive "dialectic" of past and present faith, John Henry Newman's 
noetic metaphor of doctrines as ideas in process of clarification, and 20th-
century appeals to ongoing "reception" on the part of believers. Invoking 
the image of analogy to account for the development of doctrine might be 
felicitous for several reasons. First, and as noted earlier, analogy has been 
a template for describing the God-world relationship throughout much of 
the Catholic tradition, perhaps because analogical homology reflects the 
deeply sacramental spirituality of the Catholic tradition expressed espe-
cially in its beliefs in the eucharistic Real Presence, the knowability of God 
through creation, and the human person's capacity for free response to the 
offer of grace. Second, employing the category of analogy in a theology of 
tradition interprets the tradition by appeal to a traditional conceptualiza-
tion and rhetoric, a theological approach that affirms the resiliency of the 
tradition as a source of meaning. Third, and finally, enlisting analogy to 
explain traditional similarity in the face of historical difference fits well 
with the retrospective account of tradition presented here. Analogy offers 
a way of appreciating how a present-day faith, looking to configure its 
authoritative heritage back to the apostolic age, finds homologies through 
a past rife with differences between what Christians claim as tradition 
today and what Christians did or did not claim as tradition in any previous 
historical moment. The analogical image conveys the assumptions of the 
retrospective model, particularly its expectation that the unity of tradition 
continues to be tempered by historical difference and yet may be mean-
ingfully affirmed in spite of historical difference. 
Analogy, of course, could be put to the service of a prospective account 
of tradition, and tacitly often is. But when it is, an established tradition 
tends to see only itself in the latest passing moment, assuming, contrary to 
the evidence of history, that the continuance of tradition will reiterate only 
what has been. Here analogical homology breaks down, losing its rightful 
29
 See ibid. 100-28. 
THE ANALOGY OF TRADITION 377 
appreciation for the differences that ever contextualize similarity and giv-
ing way to a narcissistic fixation on tradition's customary face. It is precisely 
in this regard that the Fourth Lateran Council's "rule of faith" on analogy 
might be applied, not in the metaphysical context in which it was originally 
defined but in the linguistic setting of a theology of tradition. The teaching 
of the Council—that "between creator and creature there can be noted no 
similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between 
them"30—should remind us that tradition is the Church's ongoing, and very 
tentative, effort to name the presence of God's Spirit in history. Portrayed 
as analogical homology, traditional continuity names the Spirit's presence 
in a particular configuration of belief, doctrine, and practice from present 
to past.31 But however much confidence the Church places in its naming of 
traditional continuity, it must be ready to acknowledge that its naming is 
never adequate to what is being named, not only because God is beyond 
human naming but also because God's gift of the Spirit continues to course 
through history in surprising ways that should undermine any sense that 
what the Church claims as the continuity of tradition has been utterly 
settled. 
ANALOGY IN THEOLOGICAL METHOD 
Now we are ready to attempt an answer to the question of how congru-
ence is achieved in theological judgment. The workings of tradition 
sketched above will point the way to our answer. First, though, we should 
state what our answer will not be. We will not address this question in a 
Kantian manner, taking it to be a question about the transcendental con-
ditions that attend the theological task. That kind of question is asked when 
theology is regarded first and foremost as an exercise in apologetics, and 
theologians have the utmost concern to justify what they do before the 
court of reason at-large. Our approach to the question should measure the 
possibility of theological judgment by what faith actually does, in coopera-
tion with reason, in making a theological judgment. The context for asking 
and answering the question should be the community of faith in which 
asking and answering takes place first and foremost as an exercise in eccle-
sial responsibility and self-understanding, and not as an exercise in self-
justification. 
Congruence in theological judgment is achieved as theological judgment 
30
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follows the actual lines of congruence shaped by faithful judgments about 
traditional continuity. Christian communities constantly chart their claims 
for the congruence of tradition by re-affirming long-held lines of continu-
ity, adjusting new claims for tradition to these well-hewn paths back to the 
apostolic age, and occasionally leaving behind past claims that the com-
munity no longer finds worthy of belief or practice. The congruence 
claimed in theological judgment is the very same congruence that different 
acts of faith make in positing a particular configuration of traditional con-
gruence. The congruence claimed may be a time-honored line of literal-
sense continuity that charts the tradition's most basic beliefs. Or the con-
gruence claimed may be a new affirmation of continuity that configures the 
ancient tradition in a somewhat different way, but which yet clamors for 
recognition as the rightful authority of the past. Typically, theological rep-
resentations of literal-sense congruence proceed aesthetically by way of 
description, while theological representations of novel congruence proceed 
forensically by way of argumentation. Any theology, though, makes its case 
for truthfulness by adjusting its judgments to a particular pattern of ana-
logical continuity that stretches, retrospectively, from present to past. A 
judgment for theological congruence may be very much like the act of 
repetition that any claim for literal sense tradition is, finding truth in an 
analogical homology weighted decidedly on the side of traditional similar-
ity. Or a judgment for theological congruence may bind beliefs across time 
unusually, finding truth in an analogical homology that appreciates creative 
difference and envisions tradition in new ways. In either case, theological 
judgments for congruence mirror traditional judgments for congruence. 
The practice of theology, rightly understood, is the practice of tradition. 
We might think of theological judgments for congruence as specialized 
forms of traditional judgments for congruence. Their specialized character 
is a function of the knowledge that theologians possess about the historical 
dimensions of tradition, a knowledge that most believers throughout the 
tradition have lacked. While all believers encounter tradition holistically in 
the living intersections of belief, practice, and worship, theologians are able 
to conceive of tradition in a linear way and to perceive how the analogy of 
tradition configures continuity in ways that run counter to a faithless chro-
nology of the past. This knowledge presents no advantage to faith. But it 
does enable theologians to understand how the development of doctrine 
has transpired throughout Catholic tradition and to appreciate the contri-
butions of theological judgment to that process. Theological judgments for 
congruence are an important way, though not the only way, of bringing the 
tradition under reflective scrutiny so that ancient claims for analogical 
continuity may once again be affirmed meaningfully in the present moment 
or so that new claims might be ranked analogically among the treasures of 
the past in spite of their chronological audacity. As an exercise in the 
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development of doctrine, the theological judgment for congruence has a 
role in shaping the very same traditional judgment for congruence that it 
mirrors. 
This close relationship between theological judgment and traditional 
judgment should be reflected in methodological considerations of the theo-
logical task. I propose that we think of theological method as the analogy 
of tradition, since the congruence to which theological judgment aspires is 
achieved by drawing the same analogical lines of continuity between 
present and past that traditional judgments draw in developing the tradi-
tion in every passing moment.32 Delineating this theological method would 
be no different from describing the various ways in which faith analogically 
claims the congruence of tradition. And this, in turn, means that the 
method of theology lies in the exercise of traditional faith itself, most 
especially at the point that method explains how congruence in theological 
judgment is achieved. Method is not something imported into theology to 
explain the possibility of theological judgment but is itself an implemen-
tation of that same faithful judgment. 
From a certain perspective, this might seem to be a claim falsely inflated 
in its simplicity, and one that runs counter to the current proposal. Anal-
ogy, a critic might object, is not traditional faith but a theoretical account 
of how faith is construed historically. And once enlisted into theological 
service, analogy behaves like any theory of correlation, biting off far more 
than it can chew in accounting for how theological judgment achieves 
congruence. Although I would be willing to concede that analogy is a 
theory, I would argue that its interpretive history in Catholic theology 
demonstrates its compatibility with the basic claims of faith that it explains, 
even to the extent that analogical discourse has entered the rhetoric of faith 
in the Catholic tradition. Moreover, the analogy of tradition, as presented 
here, explains what faith has done in the past and what faith continues to 
do in the future. Analogical thinking finds meaningful patterns of unity 
through the confusion of linguistic, experiential, and metaphysical plural-
ity. The analogy of tradition is shaped as the whole Church together finds 
the authoritative continuity of tradition through the chaos of chronological 
time. Proposed here as theological method, the analogy of tradition is a 
way of understanding the actual use to which theological judgment puts a 
particular claim for congruence.33 Finally, that interpretive use can only be 
32
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measured against the use to which the Church puts its claims in faith for 
traditional congruence. 
Analogy thus understood is not a special theory imported as a relevant 
means for parsing the experience of the Church. It is a way of imaging the 
remarkable process through which the Church professes the distinctive 
presence of God to history, a presence that surprises as much as it stead-
fastly abides. Special theories may aid in explaining the first and second 
moments of correlation, in recovering the ancient past or in elucidating the 
present moment. But they cannot explain how traditional or theological 
congruence between those moments is achieved. Traditional or theological 
congruence is finally achieved by grace, and the analogy of tradition de-
scribes how faith gracefully and actually claims divine pattern in history. It 
may be that the metaphors of reconciliation that convey the act of synthetic 
judgment in the method of correlation's third moment are but stylized ways 
of describing the use to which a theological judgment of congruence is put. 
But if so, then there may be advantage to realizing what actually transpires 
beneath the style, as well as in knowing that the conditions of the possibility 
of theological congruence in no way make congruence actually happen.34 
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